U.S. Tariffs Strengthen China’s Energy Cooperation With Central Asia

A sharp increase in tariffs on U.S. LNG could become a serious challenge for China. Since mid-February 2025, shipments from the U.S. have almost ceased due to a 49 percent duty imposed as part of the trade wars, making gas economically unfeasible.

In this context, the Central Asian countries—despite seasonal export cuts caused by an unusually cold winter and rising domestic consumption—have come to the forefront of Beijing’s energy strategy, with Moscow playing an active role.

In February 2025, a delegation of leading Chinese energy companies visited Kazakhstan. An agreement was signed to increase the volume of gas supplied in 2024–2025 by one third compared to the existing contract.

Under the auspices of this year’s “China–Central Asia” summit, many other important events in the field of energy cooperation are expected. Thanks to Central Asia, China will be able to compensate for its gas deficit and reduce vulnerabilities associated with maritime supply routes.

EVEN WITH DECLINING VOLUMES, CHINA PLANS TO EXPAND GAS IMPORTS FROM CENTRAL ASIA IN 2025

At the beginning of 2025, pipeline gas volumes from Central Asia fell to their lowest level in nearly ten years: in February total shipments amounted to just 2.4 billion m³—the last time that level was recorded was in July 2016. Kazakhstan is already planning to expand exports: QazaqGaz and PetroChina signed an addendum to their three-year contract, locking in increased deliveries.

The reasons for this temporary decline are simple. An extremely cold winter significantly boosted domestic demand in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. This “ate up” most of the production.

From the Russian side, gas shipments to the region are gradually increasing. The potential to boost Russian gas exports to Central Asia is estimated at up to 10–12 billion m³ per year. This frees up additional capacity for exports to China.

Meanwhile, QazaqGaz is cooperating with Gazprom in managing the Central Asia–Center pipeline. This scheme allows Russian gas to cover Central Asian needs and, at the same time, increases the flow of Central Asian gas into China.

Attention has already been given to Kazakhstan’s pipeline, which is operating at only 70 percent of its capacity: the countries of the region and Chinese partners have agreed to increase it.

CHINA PURSUES A STRATEGIC GOAL—REDUCE DEPENDENCE ON MARITIME SUPPLIES

At the same time, China is seeking alternatives to U.S. LNG. It is known that CNOOC signed a five-year contract with ADNOC (UAE) for the supply of 500,000 tons of LNG annually starting in 2026. However, maritime routes carry political and transportation risks. In October 2024, Sanjar Zharkeshov, Chairman of the Board of NC QazaqGaz, noted that LNG prices are hard to compare with pipeline gas.

At the “China–Central Asia” summit in Xi’an, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed creating a “China–Central Asia” energy partnership, accelerating the construction of the fourth pipeline line, and continuing to ramp up hydrocarbon trade.

The importance of Central Asia is clear: over 80 percent of China’s imports travel by sea. Traditional routes run through “chokepoints” such as the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz, posing serious geopolitical risks.

CONCLUSION

In sum, considering all factors, Beijing can expect that by the end of 2025 the volume of gas imports from Central Asia will exceed last year’s figures.