Suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty to Escalate Afghanistan–Pakistan Tensions and Affect Central Asia
Water has become a tool of pressure following the military conflict between India and Pakistan. After the April 22 attack on tourists in Kashmir, India’s Security Committee on April 23 suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty until there is “convincing and irreversible” cessation of Pakistan’s support for terrorism.
The treaty governs the distribution of six rivers — the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej — between India and Pakistan. For the first time in 65 years, data exchange, monitoring, and cooperation have been suspended, depriving Pakistan of vital information on water flow, floods, and droughts.
Although India cannot completely cut off the water supply, 80% of Pakistan’s irrigated land depends on these rivers, creating a significant vulnerability. In the short term, this complicates irrigation planning ahead of the monsoon season, and in the long term, it may force Pakistan to reassess its water relations with Afghanistan over transboundary rivers — with implications for Central Asia.
PROBABILITY OF ISLAMABAD–KABUL CONFRONTATION REMAINS HIGH
The suspension of the treaty will exacerbate already tense water relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Without a water-sharing mechanism for their nine shared rivers, previous cooperation attempts have failed. When Indus flows decrease, up to 17% of Pakistan’s winter reserves are covered by the Kabul River.
Afghanistan’s water infrastructure plans — including the Gambiri Dam on the Kunar River, 12 reservoirs with a capacity of 4.7 million acre-feet, and the Kajaki, Kamal Khan, and Namak Ab dams — could further reduce downstream flow. India’s involvement in financing these Afghan dams intensifies Pakistan’s concerns, as it is viewed as a strategic blockade.
In the absence of a binding agreement and amid rising climate stress, Pakistan may demand stronger water guarantees, while Afghanistan is likely to press ahead with its projects. India’s unilateral suspension of the Indus Treaty sets a dangerous precedent, complicating Afghan–Pakistani negotiations:
- It undermines the sanctity of international treaties and the trust of downstream countries.
- It emphasizes the power of upstream states, which could encourage Afghanistan to take similar steps.
- Climate change strengthens arguments for renegotiating water-sharing agreements, particularly in the absence of enforcement mechanisms.
ESCALATION OF WATER CONFLICTS IN SOUTH ASIA WILL HAVE DIRECT IMPACT ON CENTRAL ASIA
The erosion of trust in transboundary agreements may encourage upstream countries like Afghanistan to claim a greater share of river flows. The Qosh Tepa Canal, currently under construction, diverts about 10 km³ of water annually, around 20–25% of the Amu Darya’s flow, potentially reducing water inflows to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan by up to 15%. This could worsen water shortages in Bukhara, Khorezm, and Karakalpakstan, and further deplete the Southern Aral Sea.
The absence of water agreements with Afghanistan, and its non-recognition under the 1992 Almaty Acts, complicates efforts to establish new frameworks, despite Tashkent’s active diplomacy (such as the intergovernmental commission, visits by Minister Sh. Hamraev, and barter deals involving electricity and gas). While these moves signal a willingness to engage, the risk of escalation remains due to climate pressure and the strategic interests of South Asian states.
In sum, India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty represents an attempt to revise the terms and assert national interests. Transboundary rivers are becoming a shared geopolitical issue for Central and South Asia. Against this backdrop, it is essential for Central Asian states to initiate a regional dialogue on water security with South Asian countries.
