Donald Trump’s threat of 100 % secondary tariffs on any country that keeps buying Russian goods is no longer just a headline‐grabbing gambit; it is a direct challenge to the energy calculus that has bound Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi since 2022.

As China and India weigh the cost of forfeiting U.S. market access against discounted Russian barrels, the strategic geometry of Eurasian energy is poised for its sharpest pivot in a decade.

Tariff Shockwaves: Redrawing the Russia-India-China Triangle

Russian crude exports have become critically concentrated: China now absorbs roughly 47 % and India another 38 %, leaving Moscow exposed to the policy decisions of just two buyers.

Trump’s 50-day ultimatum and the even harsher 500 % tariff proposal embedded in the “Sanctioning Russia Act” forces Beijing and New Delhi into a stark cost-benefit test.

For India, continued reliance on Russian oil (about 40 % of total imports and 2 million bpd in June 2025) collides with the risk of tariffs on high-margin exports such as pharmaceuticals, IT services, and textiles.

China confronts an even greater dilemma: its vast consumer-goods pipeline to the United States would suffer inflation-fuelled demand destruction if container flows again collapse.

Both capitals have already signalled sensitivity to sanction friction, halting March-delivery Russian cargoes when freight rates spiked, and can quickly revert to Middle-Eastern suppliers.

Their likely short-term response is a managed draw-down of Russian purchases that keeps domestic energy inflation in check while signalling goodwill to Washington.

Beijing’s Energy Sovereignty and the Limits of Russian Leverage

China’s broader energy posture complicates Moscow’s hopes of replacing lost demand. Accounting for a third of global energy investment, Beijing is racing toward self-insurance: record-setting additions of coal generation ( > 100 GW in 2024), world leader in world battery-storage capacity, and domination of renewable supply chains, from critical minerals to finished solar panels, mean that its energy security no longer depends on any single external supplier.

Parallel spending on coal-to-chemicals and synthetic fuels further dilutes import vulnerability, while surging electric-vehicle adoption has already begun eroding Chinese gasoline demand.

In this context, Russia’s ambition to “bite off” incremental Chinese market share faces structural resistance. Beijing will not permit any foreign source to cover more than about 30 % of crude imports, especially when Saudi and Emirati barrels compete aggressively in Asia.

China can absorb higher Middle-Eastern volumes, draw on strategic reserves, and lean on its expanding green capacity-all while bargaining harder for discounts from Moscow.

Map source: Incorrys.