Russia has gone all-in, becoming the first country in the world to recognize the Taliban movement as Afghanistan’s official governing authority. This decision reflects a calculation to expand its influence across Central Asia, gaining access to the southern shores of Iran and Pakistan. Ongoing security contacts with Kabul and the development of transport infrastructure in Afghanistan through Central Asia serve to “cement” Moscow’s presence in the region.

AFGHANISTAN AT THE CENTER OF CHINA–CENTRAL ASIA COOPERATION

This development reveals a covert rivalry between China and Russia over emerging security opportunities in Central Asia, set against the backdrop of engagement with Afghanistan. As early as 2021, the foreign ministers of China and the Central Asian states signed a joint statement on Afghanistan, pledging to support counter-terrorism efforts, and Afghanistan’s integration into regional projects.

And this commitment did not remain merely on paper. Afghanistan became a focal topic at the “Central Asia–China” summit, where President Xi Jinping expressed Beijing’s readiness to assist the Central Asian countries in combating terrorism and transnational organized crime. Moreover, China succeeded in folding Afghanistan into its flagship Belt and Road Initiative by extending the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), despite ongoing conflicts and skirmishes along the Afghan–Pakistani border.

Afghanistan also acts as a catalyst for bringing Central Asian states closer to Moscow. Russia’s direct channels with Kabul provide intelligence on terrorist activities—a fact Putin underscored by calling Afghanistan “Russia’s ally in the fight against terrorism.”

MOSCOW’S ADVANTAGE — INSTITUTIONAL TOOLS IN CENTRAL ASIA

China wields substantial financial influence, and protecting its investments is the defining motive behind Beijing’s drive to deepen security ties in Central Asia.

According to reports, under joint border-security mechanisms, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have established a “border security belt” through intelligence-sharing, joint patrols, and military exercises. For example, Chinese and Tajik border forces regularly conduct joint patrols on the Pamir Plateau.

Yet Moscow retains a key institutional advantage: its multilateral frameworks incorporate all five Central Asian republics, and potentially Afghanistan in the future, as observers or partners within the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Within the CIS, Russia can convene every regional capital in a single forum—from defense ministers to the Council of CIS Border Commanders. In 2023, the first meeting of security-council secretaries from Russia and the Central Asian states took place. Russian intelligence officials have also been invited to major Afghanistan conferences: in October 2022 in Tashkent and in 2025 in Baku, where Foreign Intelligence Service Director Naryshkin delivered a keynote address.