Moscow’s quest for an outlet to the Indian Ocean via the South Caucasus and Central Asia carries strategic weight, yet two chokepoints now inject uncertainty. Since December 2024 relations with Baku have deteriorated after the “Baku–Grozny” flight crash, while the Iran-Israel escalation calls the safety of Persian Gulf routes into question.

Against this backdrop the Kremlin is pivoting toward Afghanistan: crossing that country and Central Asia would open access to Iranian and Pakistani ports without depending on Baku or Tehran’s positions.

BAKU–MOSCOW CONFRONTATION IMPERILS DEVELOPMENT OF THE “NORTH–SOUTH” CORRIDOR VIA AZERBAIJAN

The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) has three branches: the western (Azerbaijan–Iran), the Trans-Caspian, and the eastern (Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Iran with a spur into Afghanistan). Disruptions persist on the western line: the Rasht–Astara rail segment will not launch until 2028, and political frictions inflate transaction risks.

Logistics operators are therefore shifting cargo eastward: that branch’s share in Russian Railways’ INSTC traffic grew from 67 % in 2022 to 78 % in 2024, moving 1.9 thousand TEU of the corridor’s 2.4 thousand.

In May 2025 Moscow and Kabul signed a package of memoranda covering hydrocarbon exploration, trade, and transport links. Russia—together with Uzbekistan—is drafting a feasibility study for a Trans-Afghan railway, weighing two alignments: “Termez – Naybabād – Logar – Kharlachi” and “Mazar-i-Sharif – Herat – Kandahar – Chaman.” The goal is to finish design work by 2026 and, during the late 2020s, build a line capable of 20–22 million t per year.

Presidential envoy Zamir Kabulov openly calls the Taliban government a Russian ally against transnational terrorism, easing the project’s political logistics.

THE IRAN–ISRAEL CONFLICT CREATES A “WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY” FOR A RUSSIA-AFGHANISTAN BREAKTHROUGH

Rocket strikes exchanged by Israel and Iran threaten to choke off Afghanistan’s food and fuel imports through Iranian ports. Kabul is scrambling to diversify and has expanded deals with Russia: the May MoUs envisage an industrial-logistics cluster and an increase in bilateral trade from US $323 million in 2024 to US $3 billion by end-2025.

Moscow, for its part, promises work quotas for up to 1,000 Afghan citizens—a sharp contrast to Iran’s deportation of 750,000 Afghans by late 2024.

Graph source: Index1520