Two competing, but potentially complementary, railway corridors are racing to stitch Afghanistan back into a gateway between Central and South Asia. Whichever line moves freight first will not only dictate regional logistics but also crown its sponsor as Central Asia’s primary bridge to the Indian Ocean.

Parallel Corridors, Common Calculus

Two distinct yet converging trilateral formats:

–      Kazakhstan‑Turkmenistan‑Afghanistan (KTA) and,

–      Uzbekistan‑Afghanistan‑Pakistan (UAP)

have crystallised since 2024, signalling Central Asia’s determination to rewrite its own transit map. Astana’s April 2024 Kabul summit and its July 2024 follow‑up in Aktau locked in favourable tariffs and a Kazakh‑funded upgrade of the 115‑km Turgundi–Herat railway.

By July 2025, Foreign Minister Murat Nurtleu’s Kabul visit elevated the plan into a US $500 million memorandum and set an ambitious US $3 billion trade target. Underlying the KTA track is the eastern branch of the International North‑South Transport Corridor envisioned to route Russian and Belarusian cargo through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan before fanning out toward India and the Gulf.

Tashkent’s response has been no less audacious. The UAP format moved from concept to ministerial endorsement in a single year, capped by the 17‑18 July 2025 signing of a Framework Agreement for a 640‑km, US $7 billion Termez‑Mazar‑Kabul‑Peshawar railway. If realised, the line would slash freight times to Pakistani seaports and give land‑locked Central Asia its first direct outlet to the Indian Ocean.

For Afghanistan, both corridors promise transit revenues and much‑needed economic normalisation; for Turkmenistan and Pakistan, they open peripheral provinces to cross‑border trade.

Competition or Complementarity?

While officials frame the two railways as complementary “spokes” of a regional hub‑and‑spoke system, competitive undercurrents are hard to miss.

Kazakhstan’s bet on the Turgundi‑Herat link consolidates its traditional west‑east logistics role and preserves a Russia‑connected supply chain, yet it also positions Astana as Afghanistan’s large‑scale rail investor, potentially locking in favourable tariffs and soft‑power dividends.

Conversely, Uzbekistan’s UAP gambit leverages Pakistan’s maritime access and bypasses both Russia and Iran, aligning neatly with Tashkent’s longer‑term goal of strategic diversification away from northern chokepoints.

The projects also differ in political optics. Astana couches its initiative in multilateral language , by citing EAEU and INSTC synergies – while Tashkent foregrounds sovereignty and pragmatic engagement with the Taliban.

In doing so, each capital signals to external partners (China, India, the Gulf states) that it can deliver a distinct, less‑crowded gateway into Afghanistan’s still‑opaque business landscape.

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