China to Focus on Central Asian Security Amid India–Pakistan Conflict
The current escalation between India and Pakistan has become a critical link in the broader confrontation between Beijing and Washington, significantly limiting China’s access to traditional maritime routes. In an effort to bypass the threat of a blockade, China is investing up to $65 billion in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the ports of Gwadar and Karachi, which provide an alternative route around the Strait of Malacca.
However, the growing tension between Delhi and Islamabad now threatens the CPEC itself: a disruption in Pakistan would automatically compromise this corridor, turning it into both a strategic asset and an Achilles’ heel for China.
This situation highlights the strategic importance of transport corridors through Central Asia (CA) for China, as any disruption in their operation is something Beijing cannot afford.
THE INDIA–PAKISTAN CONFLICT PUTS BEIJING IN A DIFFICULT POSITION
China’s investments in the CPEC are its main “loophole” to bypass U.S.-led island chains in the Pacific. However, rising tensions between Delhi and Islamabad, along with the vulnerability of the Gwadar and Karachi ports, now endanger the security of these investments.
The escalation following the April 22, 2025 terrorist attack in Pahalgam and the launch of “Operation Sindoor” became the most intense conflict during peacetime: India struck more than six targets using cruise missiles, drones, and artillery. Pakistan responded by announcing the downing of 25 Indian drones and five fighter jets. On May 7, India and Pakistan engaged in the largest air battle in modern history.
For the first time since 1971, India released water into the Chenab River and suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, prompting the evacuation of border villages and the closure of airspace. The Indus Basin accounts for around 80% of Pakistan’s irrigated agriculture, a sector that makes up roughly 25% of the country’s GDP and employs 65% of the workforce.
Unlike the 2019 clash, which was limited to missile exchanges and pilot captures, this time the conflict involves air forces, naval assets, and reinforced defense positions along the Line of Control.
The removal of all previous restraints has become the new norm, drastically increasing risks for both Pakistan and Chinese investments, especially considering existing threats along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border and in Balochistan.
SECURITY BECOMES CHINA’S PRIORITY IN CENTRAL ASIA
On May 1, after 25 years of negotiations, construction began on key infrastructure for the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, underlining Central Asia’s strategic importance for China amid global and regional conflicts.
This growth in investment is driving expanded security cooperation, modeled after China–Pakistan relations. As Xi Jinping stated at the “China–CA” summit in Xi’an (2023), “The sovereignty, security, independence, and territorial integrity of Central Asian countries must be ensured, and their efforts toward peace and good neighborliness must be supported…”
China will focus on intelligence sharing, cooperation between law enforcement agencies, and cybersecurity with Central Asian states, in response to the threat of “color revolutions” and foreign interference — risks already identified in the Xi’an Declaration.
Accordingly, the emphasis on internal threats justifies the need for large-scale economic investments in Central Asian countries.
In sum, China is forced to strengthen joint security measures in Central Asia to protect its energy and trade corridors. In response, Russia is likely to organize its own “Russia–Central Asia” forum after the June “China–Central Asia” summit in Astana, aiming to discuss regional security issues and balance China’s growing influence.
