The loss of Niger as a key uranium supplier has pushed Paris to rapidly pivot its resource strategy toward Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Yet Russia’s grip on the critical stages of the nuclear‑fuel cycle leaves France far less room for maneuver than it once enjoyed in Africa, turning regional competition into a search for “windows” within Moscow’s technological and logistical ecosystem.

FRANCE, CHINA, AND RUSSIA TAKE THEIR RESPECTIVE URANIUM SHARES IN CENTRAL ASIA

The coup in Niger upended France’s supply chain – up to 40 % of EDF’s uranium imports suddenly hung in the balance. Paris responded by accelerating Orano’s footprint: on 3 July 2025 the KATCO joint venture commissioned the South Tortkuduk processing plant (2,000 t U per year) set a target of 4,000 t annual output by 2026.

In parallel, Orano may invest up to $500 mln in uranium mining in Uzbekistan, counting on the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan tandem to cover roughly 20 percent of France’s demand by decade’s end.

China, meanwhile, is scooping up stakes where Russia is willing to “dilute” its share for liquidity: in 2024 SNURDC acquired 49.98 % in the Zarechnoye joint venture, and CNNC moved to take 30 % in North Khorasan. These deals secure feedstock for Beijing’s plan to build 150 reactors by 2035.

Russia still holds the deepest position. Through Uranium One, Rosatom maintains sizeable stakes in five of Kazakhstan’s largest ventures, keeping a flow of over 4,800 t U each year.

RUSSIA RETAINS CLOUT VIA URANIUM PROCESSING AND NUCLEAR‑POWER CONSTRUCTION IN CENTRAL ASIA

Dominance hinges on technology and infrastructure. Kazakhstan relies almost exclusively on enrichment services in Novouralsk and Angarsk, where Rosatom has guaranteed access until 2043 (up to 2.5 million SWU per year). Without domestic enrichment, Astana must export concentrate and re‑import enriched material for the Ulba‑FA fuel plant, even after receiving Cameco’s conversion technology.

Building Kazakhstan’s first VVER‑1200 nuclear plant for $14 billion will cement this dependency: fuel supply, servicing, and upgrades will remain Russian for at least four decades. Parallel Rosatom projects in Uzbekistan and talks on small modular reactors in Kyrgyzstan weave a network of long‑term obligations – from reactor licenses to waste management.

Consequently, France is forced to “play by Russia’s rules”: lacking access to enrichment and reactor technology, its successes stop at the mining stage. Paris can only strengthen its hand by offering Kazakhstan alternatives to Russian conversion and logistics (e.g., investing in the port of Kuryk or Caspian transit routes), measures that merely reduce (rather than eliminate) Moscow’s influence.

The coup in Niger opened a fresh uranium window for France, but Russia still holds the frame. More graphs and facts in our file below .

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