A couple of years ago, Ankara was seen in the region more as a loud political partner than as a serious investor: money flowed almost exclusively to Azerbaijan, and figures for the other countries were merely symbolic.

But over 2020–2025 the picture has changed radically: Turkish investments in Central Asia have multiplied, and the distribution of capital has reordered the internal hierarchy among the members and observers of the Organization of Turkic States.

TURKEY’S “LEAP OF THE DECADE” IN UZBEKISTAN AND THE KAZAKH BREAKTHROUGH

For two decades, Turkish funds poured into almost a single destination – in 2002–2014 Azerbaijan received a total of $6.9 billion, including a record $1.9 billion in 2014, according to statistics from the Central Bank of Turkey. In fact, Azerbaijan invested more in Turkey than vice versa.

According to aggregate data for 1995–2021, Azerbaijan’s direct investments in Turkey totaled $20.3 billion, while Turkey’s FDI in Azerbaijan over the same period reached $13.3 billion. After 2015, the curve plunged: annual inflows fell to mere tens of millions, and Baku lost its exclusivity.

Since 2016 Kazakhstan has been attracting $30–80 million per year, building its accumulated portfolio to $2.9 billion; by 2024 Astana was matching Azerbaijan’s early-stage pace, and Uzbekistan even recorded an “investment leap of the decade.”

In 2018, Turkish investments in Uzbekistan barely reached $7 million; by 2023 they jumped to $80 million, in 2024 to $97 million, and the number of joint ventures tripled to 1,900.

Construction, energy, textiles, and agro-processing are the key sectors where Turkish firms not only sell equipment but establish full-scale production clusters. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan has reclaimed its status as the region’s main “magnet” for capital: since 2016 the Turkish investment portfolio there has grown 2.5 times, with an increase of $1.3 billion in the first half of 2024 alone.

TAJIKISTAN SURPASSES TURKMENISTAN BUT REMAINS ON “MICRO-SHARES”

The disparity within Central Asia is striking. Tajikistan, where Turkish investments have been only episodic, still attracted more than gas-rich Turkmenistan: its main surge was $19 million in 2015, with a few smaller infusions thereafter.

Turkmenistan, by contrast, remains almost a “blank spot” for Ankara, despite evident needs in construction and energy cooperation.

This imbalance underscores that the mere political umbrella of the OTS does not guarantee capital inflows—investors head where there is privatization, tax incentives, and a promising domestic market.

It is precisely with these tools that Tashkent and Astana have in recent years narrowed their gap with Baku, rebranding themselves as a trio of regional hubs.