Tensions with Pakistan Lead a Surge in Afghanistan’s Trade with Central Asia, Other Partners

Border clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been intensifying since March 2024, straining Afghanistan’s vital border trade with Pakistan. Faced with shrinking access to its traditional trade partner, Afghanistan is reorienting its economy northward, creating new opportunities for Central Asia, Russia and Iran.

The October 2025 escalations marked the worst escalation since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. With major crossings like Torkham and Spin Boldak frequently closed for weeks, Afghanistan’s economic arteries have narrowed. These confrontations are part of a longer pattern. Since 2021, Pakistan has repeatedly targeted TTP hideouts across the Durand Line, while the Taliban has responded with cross-border fire and public defiance. 

By late 2024, trade between the two countries had plummeted. Afghan officials reported an estimated 60% decline in transit trade, with transit flows through Pakistan down by 80% compared to pre-2021 levels. Hundreds of Afghan export items were blocked, and annual trade with Pakistan shrank from $2.87 billion to roughly $1.1 billion.

The map shows Afghanistan’s main trade corridors connecting to Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, highlighting key transit points and locations of border clashes with Pakistan as of October 2025.

Central Asia Steps in As Alternative Partner

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have taken the lead in forging new commercial corridors with Afghanistan. In 2024, Uzbekistan-Afghanistan trade surged past $1.1 billion, with over $1 billion representing Uzbek exports. The scale was striking: Tashkent’s exports eclipsed historical norms, driven by fuel, wheat flour, and consumer goods. Around 650 Afghan trucks operated daily in Uzbekistan, a logistical sign of deepening ties. Afghan officials publicly thanked Uzbekistan for its constructive stance, and both sides pledged to double trade to $2 billion in the coming years.

Kazakhstan has also played a major role, particularly in the food security domain. In 2024, Kazakh exports to Afghanistan reached $527 million, led by flour, grain, and cooking oil. Despite policy restrictions that reduced direct wheat exports, Kazakhstan compensated by increasing flour shipments, which now account for more than half of its exports to Afghanistan. In October 2024, both countries signed a roadmap to boost annual trade to $3 billion, including new transport infrastructure and expanded export categories. Kazakhstan’s removal of the Taliban from its terrorist list and efforts to streamline cross-border trade illustrate a pragmatic strategy that has paid off.

Iran Becomes Afghanistan’s Top Partner

Nowhere has Afghanistan’s trade pivot been more visible than with Iran. In 2024, Iranian exports to Afghanistan soared to $3.1 billion, up by nearly 84 percent from 2023 levels. Iran became Kabul’s largest trading partner, surpassing both Pakistan and India. Fuel, construction materials, iron, and food topped the export list. Key crossings like Dogharoon in eastern Iran saw a 25% year-on-year rise in shipments. Iranian authorities reported 1.95 million tonnes of goods exported to Afghanistan in just ten months through Dogharoon, a 70% surge in transit volumes.

This boom coincided directly with Pakistani border closures. Afghan importers began using Iranian ports like Chabahar and Bandar Abbas to circumvent Pakistani bottlenecks. One Iranian official noted that Iran was “taking over Pakistan’s role” as Afghanistan’s trade lifeline. With routes open, prices relatively stable, and logistics improving, Iran’s economic relevance to Afghanistan deepened. Afghanistan, in turn, became one of Iran’s top five export destinations, a geopolitical reversal from just a few years prior.

The map and chart illustrate Afghanistan’s growing trade alignment with Iran and Russia through the International North–South Transport Corridor and Iranian ports, while trade with Pakistan has sharply declined between 2022 and 2024. Data Source: UN Comtrade.

Russia Makes Inroads into Kabul

As traditional partners faltered, Russia emerged as a new commercial actor in Afghanistan. In 2024, Afghanistan became Russia’s largest flour export market, importing nearly $80 million worth of Russian flour, double the amount from the year before. This made up for declining Kazakh supplies and positioned Moscow as a major food supplier to Kabul.

Energy followed. After Western markets closed to Russian fuel, Moscow redirected LPG and gasoline to regional buyers. In the first half of 2025, Russian-Afghan trade reached $219 million, primarily Afghan imports of fuel, wheat, oil, and fertiliser. LPG deliveries jumped by over 50% in early 2025, making Afghanistan a key destination. Agreements on gas condensate and fuel supply were inked, with Afghan officials praising the expanding partnership.

Diplomatically, the pathway had already been cleared. In April 2025, Russia’s Supreme Court delisted the Taliban as a terrorist group. By July, Moscow accepted the Taliban’s ambassador, effectively recognising the government. Trade followed recognition. Afghanistan invited Russian firms to enter its oil and mining sectors. Kabul’s message was clear: Russia had political clearance and commercial opportunity.

Outlook

The turn toward Central Asia, Iran, and Russia reflects more than just transactional trade dynamics. It marks a broader geopolitical shift in Afghanistan’s external orientation. The repeated border shutdowns with Pakistan, combined with Islamabad’s demands on the Taliban to curtail TTP activity, have pushed Kabul to seek economic breathing room elsewhere.

This has brought dividends for middle powers. Kazakhstan is planning a $500 million railway from Turgundi to Herat. Uzbekistan and China are advancing their Termez–Mazar–Kabul corridor. Iran, long sanctioned and often overlooked, now leads Afghanistan’s trade portfolio. And Russia, once a minor actor, is expanding its economic presence as fast as its diplomats will allow.

These developments are redrawing Afghanistan’s map of dependency. No longer tied solely to Pakistan’s geography or India’s market, Kabul is threading new routes through Central Asia, Iran, and Russia. For regional actors like India and China, this creates new strategic calculations. India, which once led in exports to Central Asia, must now account for shifting transit paths through Afghan territory. China’s infrastructure projects will compete with those of Russia and Kazakhstan.

In short, Afghanistan’s economic lifelines are no longer bound to its east. In the shadow of cross-border artillery, a new trade architecture is taking shape – one driven by middle powers, alternative corridors, and the logic of survival amid geopolitical uncertainty.