The Bokhtar Project as an Example of China’s Successful Energy Strategy in Central Asia

China’s energy strategy in Central Asia is no longer limited to the region’s major oil and gas producers, but increasingly extends to smaller and more difficult markets such as Tajikistan. The Bokhtar project illustrates this logic clearly: after Western partners exited, China’s CNPC remained and ultimately secured access to one of the region’s most speculative but potentially transformative upstream assets. Whether Bokhtar proves commercially successful or not, the project already shows how Beijing is willing to absorb risk in order to lock in long-term strategic advantage in Central Asia.

The return of the United States to Asia, the strategy of containing China, and instability in the Middle East all create risks for China’s energy imports from that region and from Africa. Under such conditions, the role of Eurasia in China’s energy strategy is becoming increasingly strategic. Within this framework, Central Asia plays a key role.

If we look only at Central Asia’s oil and gas potential, available data suggests that the region holds more than 31 billion barrels of oil, or 1.8% of global reserves, and around 23.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, or more than 11.5% of global reserves. It is worth noting that these figures cover only three countries in the region: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, where most of Central Asia’s oil and gas resources are concentrated.

The Bokhtar Project: A Vivid Example of China’s Influence in Central Asia

The Bokhtar PSC (Bokhtar Production Sharing Contract) oil project is part of the Afghan-Tajik Basin, which, according to some estimates, may contain substantial oil and gas reserves, with 40% located on Tajik territory.

The first phase of the project covers the southwestern part of the basin, including areas near the borders with Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, while development initially centered around the city of Sarband, located 110 km south of Dushanbe.

The original agreement for the project was signed with the Canadian company Tethys Petroleum in 2008. The company announced the possible presence of enormous oil reserves amounting to 27.5 billion barrels in this block.

Bokhtar’s potential attracted the attention of the French company Total and China’s CNPC, which entered the project in 2013. As a result, each company ultimately held a one-third stake.

It should be noted, however, that extraction in this block is extremely difficult. The required drilling depth may reach 6 to 8 kilometers, which makes the project highly expensive. For comparison, Middle Eastern wells typically reach depths of 2 to 4 kilometers.

Over time, both Tethys and Total exited the project. The former encountered financial difficulties and was unable to fulfill its obligations, while the latter became disappointed after the project failed to meet expectations.

CNPC is now the sole participant in the project and continues exploration and data processing related to Bokhtar.

Why Beijing Has Succeeded in Tajikistan

A number of factors explain China’s success in Tajikistan as both the country’s main investor and the principal beneficiary of this relationship.

Serious Attention

Unlike Western investors, China devotes serious attention to Tajikistan. Western business often does not “see” major potential or opportunities in the country because of the relatively small size of its economy and market, and because it does not know the country well enough. Other investors, primarily Russian ones, do not possess the resource capacity that China has and likewise, in a certain sense, fail to give Tajikistan sufficient attention. Taken together, this significantly strengthens Beijing’s competitiveness.

Geography

The existence of a shared border between the two countries reduces logistical difficulties and facilitates trade. This factor can play a decisive role for investors.

Investment Without Political Conditionality

An important factor behind China’s success in Tajikistan is that its investments, especially loans and grants, are not burdened by political conditionality or by long and difficult approval procedures linked to the country’s domestic political situation.

A Comprehensive Approach and Close Ties With the Elite

Another critically important factor is the comprehensive approach mentioned above, which includes support for Tajikistan’s broader development. Contributions to the country’s development deepen China’s ties with the Tajik elite and build trust. That trust has already produced tangible results for Chinese investors, including the signing of the aforementioned agreement providing stronger guarantees for their investments.

State Protection for Investments

A very important distinguishing feature of Chinese investment is that it is largely channeled through state-owned companies. In such cases, the investments are effectively protected by the Chinese state.

Why the Outcome of Bokhtar Will Shape the Investment Climate Across the Region

The project’s future can unfold along three distinct paths, each with fundamentally different implications not only for CNPC and Tajikistan, but for the entire oil and gas investment climate in Central Asia.

Scenario One: A Major Discovery

In the first scenario, exploration confirms significant reserves close to the original estimates. CNPC becomes the sole beneficiary of a field that could rank among the largest in the region.

A successful Bokhtar outcome would immediately be reinterpreted as proof that Central Asia’s geological potential has been systematically underestimated by Western and Russian players. This would lead to rising interest in unallocated blocks, intensify competitive pressure on the negotiating positions of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and accelerate exploration activity across the Afghan-Tajik Basin.

Beijing would also lock in the strategic first-mover advantage for which it was willing to take the risk alone.

Scenario Two: A Moderate but Commercially Viable Discovery

In the second scenario, reserves are confirmed but prove to be significantly smaller than the original forecasts. The project remains commercially viable at CNPC’s current technological level, but does not transform the regional energy balance.

For China, this is still an acceptable outcome: the project continues, the investment pays off, and Beijing’s presence in the Tajik market is preserved and deepened.

For outside investors, this scenario would signal that geological estimates in the region have historically been overstated and that serious risks remain in the development of deep-lying fields. Even if this does not fully deter investors, it would likely adjust expectations and potentially strengthen CNPC’s bargaining position in future regional projects.

Scenario Three: A Commercial Failure

In the third scenario, reserves prove insufficient for commercially viable extraction under any reasonable price assumptions. CNPC exits the project.

This would be interpreted not as an isolated failure, but as a systemic signal that the oil and gas potential of the Tajik section of the Afghan-Tajik Basin has been overstated. Interest in exploration projects in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan would likely decline more rapidly.

At the same time, China’s broader strategic presence in the Tajik economy would not disappear, because it is far too diversified to depend on a single project.

Chinese Investment in Tajikistan

Although the three countries listed above are the region’s most resource-rich states and largest economies, China does not exclude Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan from its regional energy resource strategy. Beijing understands that these countries lack the capacity to build production facilities, monetize their resources, and develop infrastructure on their own, forcing them to seek external investment.

To draw them closer, gain access to their resources, and secure economic dividends, China applies a comprehensive approach, investing in them not only in extraction and production but also, especially through loans and grants, in infrastructure modernization and development.

From 2007 to early 2025, China invested more than $5.1 billion in Tajikistan, making it the country’s largest investor. Of this amount, $2.9 billion, or 57.4%, consisted of direct investment, while the remaining $2.2 billion, or 42.6%, fell under other investments (primarily loans and grants).

China invests in mining, manufacturing, energy, road and bridge construction, geological exploration, equipment installation, and other sectors. In total, around 700 companies with Chinese capital operate in Tajikistan.

It is important to note that in 2024, the governments of the two countries signed an Agreement on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, which offers stronger legal guarantees and protections for Chinese investors.

Tajikistan’s Oil Potential

At present, Tajikistan’s proven oil reserves amount to 12 million barrels, or around 0.00068% of global reserves. At the same time, the republic produces approximately 1% of its reserves annually.

The ratio between oil production and consumption in the country is as follows:
Production: 313 barrels per day
Consumption: 32,748 barrels per day

According to forecasts by Tajik specialists, Tajikistan’s oil reserves could amount to 113.1 million tons, or roughly 0.84 billion barrels.

Geographically, 80.8% of Tajikistan’s oil and gas reserves are concentrated in the country’s southwestern regions.