Central Asia is returning to its southern orientation, and the synchronized visits of the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Pakistan have become one of the most vivid manifestations of this pivot. Historically, Central and South Asia formed a unified political-economic space connecting the Eurasian steppes with the Indian Ocean. However, in the 19th century, the Great Game and the imperial boundaries of Britain and Russia severed these ties.

Today, the lack of sea access remains one of the region’s main barriers to development, and the geopolitical shocks of 2022 only deepened the vulnerability of the previous logistical model. Under these conditions, Central Asian states have accelerated the search for alternative export routes beyond the traditional corridors through Russia and China. Even the fragile stabilization in Afghanistan once again made South Asia not a periphery but a potential strategic direction for exports and transit.

However, developments of recent days force a reassessment of this pivot. Less than three weeks after the diplomatic handshakes in Islamabad, the Afghan-Pakistani border became a zone of open armed conflict. Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif declared on February 27 that ‘open war’ is underway between the two countries.

Pakistani air force struck Kabul, Kandahar, and Paktia, while the Taliban launched a large-scale offensive along the border in six provinces. This is why the rapprochement of Astana and Tashkent with Islamabad must be viewed not as an episode of bilateral diplomacy, but as part of a broader geo-economic restructuring of the region being carried out under sharply increased risks.

5 Key Takeaways for Business

1. Pakistan is becoming a practical southern destination for Central Asia, but implementation is frozen by conflict. New export and transit opportunities have emerged through the ports of Karachi, Gwadar, and Qasim. However, as of the date of publication, Trans-Afghan transit is completely halted and border crossings have been closed for more than four months. The signed agreements create a legal framework but not a physical corridor.

2. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are approaching Pakistan through the same logic, but with different emphases and competing routes. Kazakhstan focuses on transit architecture through western Afghanistan (Herat-Kandahar), while Uzbekistan promotes the ‘Kabul Corridor’ through central Afghanistan. Both routes are in zones of active combat. Astana and Tashkent need coordination so that competition does not dilute the regional strategy. A situation in which two incomplete corridors pass through two conflict zones reduces the chances of both projects.

3. The Afghan-Pakistani conflict has moved from the category of ‘risk’ to the category of ‘reality.’ The potential of the South Asian market is evident, however the Pakistani Defense Minister’s declaration of ‘open war,’ air strikes on Kabul, and the Taliban’s large-scale offensive indicate that the scenario of ‘unrealized potential’ has become the current reality rather than a hypothesis. Business must build in scenario planning, insurance mechanisms, and alternative routes, treating the Trans-Afghan corridor as a long-term opportunity with a prohibitive current risk level.

4. The structure of exports determines the sustainability of market presence. Uzbekistan’s experience shows that diversified exports (agri-food, textiles, processing) allow for faster trade growth: Tashkent’s trade turnover with Islamabad is five times higher than Kazakhstan’s. Kazakhstan’s commodity concentration (94% of exports are oil) narrows the room for growth and makes trade vulnerable during logistical disruptions.

5. The Indian factor creates a new geopolitical variable. The rapid rapprochement of India and the Taliban is reshaping the calculus around the Trans-Afghan corridor. For Pakistan, the Afghan direction is becoming not only a matter of combating terrorism but also an arena of rivalry with New Delhi. This strengthens Islamabad’s motivation for the use of force and makes border stabilization less likely in the medium term. Business should factor in that the southern corridor from Central Asia passes through a space of triple geopolitical rivalry.

Visits to Pakistan on the Eve of War

The state visits of President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (February 3–4) and President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev (February 5–6) confirm the growing strategic interest of Central Asia in the southern direction. Both delegations had three key objectives.

Logistical Access to the Ocean

Astana and Tashkent, as the region’s leaders, seek to reduce the costs of their landlocked position by gaining direct access to maritime logistics. The Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar are seen as potential southern gateways for the region, capable of providing Central Asian goods with access to Indian Ocean markets and onward to the Middle East and Africa.

A key element of the Kazakhstan-Pakistan package of agreements was the Transit and Trade Agreement, which secured Kazakhstan’s access to Pakistan’s port infrastructure. Kazakhstan envisions the construction of a terminal at the port of Karachi as an important transit hub not only for itself but for all Central Asian countries.

Uzbekistan signed a memorandum on preferential access to the ports of Karachi, Gwadar, and Qasim. Tashkent received a plot at Karachi port for the construction of its own logistics terminal, which will allow the country to directly manage cargo flows and reduce costs.

A Market of Nearly Two Billion Consumers

Pakistan’s population exceeds 250 million people, while neighboring India and Bangladesh are home to nearly 1.5 billion and approximately 177 million people respectively. Combined, this forms a market of nearly two billion potential consumers of Kazakhstani and Uzbek products. For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, South Asia is important as a major importer of food, raw materials, and industrial goods, including categories that do not always find comparable demand in more competitive markets.

Both states have a positive trade balance with Pakistan. Uzbekistan exports primarily agricultural products and textile raw materials: about half of its exports consist of mung beans and chickpeas, with a notable share of cotton yarn. For the first nine months of 2025, Kazakhstan’s trade turnover with Pakistan amounted to $95.8 million, with approximately 94% of exports accounted for by crude oil. For comparison, Uzbekistan’s trade turnover with Pakistan reached $474.2 million.

Source: Agency for International Trade of Uzbekistan; Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan (stat.gov.kz), 2025 data

The differences in trade volumes are partly explained by the fact that since 2022, a Preferential Trade Agreement has been in force between Uzbekistan and Pakistan. As part of the February visit, the list of preferential goods was expanded from 17 to 46 items, primarily agricultural. This explains Tashkent’s more ambitious target of increasing trade turnover to $2 billion, while Kazakhstan is targeting $1 billion.

The Defense Dimension

Pakistan is attractive to Astana and Tashkent as a state with a developed defense industrial complex. Last year, the country signed the largest contract in its history for the supply of 40 JF-17 Thunder Block III fighters to Azerbaijan, valued at approximately $4.6 billion. Notably, during the visit to Islamabad, President Mirziyoyev visited the defense company GIDS accompanied by Field Marshal Syed Asim Munir, considered the most influential figure in the Pakistani establishment. Following the visit, the defense ministers signed an action plan and roadmap for defense and military-technical cooperation.

Thus, Pakistan is becoming for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan simultaneously a logistical gateway to the ocean, a promising market, and a new partner in the sphere of security. However, the formation of Central Asia’s southern foreign economic vector directly depends on overcoming the key barrier, the scale of which has grown sharply in recent weeks.

The Afghan Puzzle: From a Fragile Window to Open War

The central dilemma of Central Asia’s entire southern strategy remains the Trans-Afghan corridor, without which access to the ports of the Indian Ocean is no more than a geopolitical idea. As recently as early February, when Presidents Tokayev and Mirziyoyev were signing transit agreements in Islamabad, the relative stabilization in Afghanistan was perceived as a fragile but real window of opportunity. By late February 2026, this window had essentially slammed shut.

Escalation Timeline: February 2026

The chain of events leading to the current crisis unfolded rapidly. On February 6, a suicide bomber struck a Shia mosque in Islamabad, killing 36 people. The ISIS-Khorasan group claimed responsibility. A militant then attacked a checkpoint in Bajaur, killing 11 soldiers and a child. On February 19, Pakistan summoned the Afghan diplomat and warned: a strike on Afghan territory would follow before the start of Ramadan if Kabul did not rein in the militants.

On the night of February 22, Pakistani air force struck the provinces of Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost, claiming the destruction of seven TTP and ISIS-K camps and the deaths of more than 80 militants. According to UNAMA, in Behsud district of Nangarhar alone, 13 civilians were killed, including women and children. This was the seventh round of Pakistani air strikes on Afghan territory since the Taliban came to power in 2021.

On February 24, skirmishes broke out near Shahkot on the border, with both sides accusing each other of provocation. On the evening of February 26, the Taliban announced the launch of ‘large-scale offensive operations’ along the border in six provinces. Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense claimed the capture of 19 Pakistani border posts and the deaths of 55 enemy servicemen (Islamabad rejected this). In response, on the night of February 27, Pakistan launched air strikes on military targets in Kabul, Kandahar, and Paktia, claiming the destruction of two brigade bases. The Pakistani side reported 133 killed Afghan fighters. A refugee camp near the Torkham crossing was also struck, with 13 civilians, including women and children, wounded.

Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif declared on February 27 that Islamabad’s patience had run out and that ‘open war’ is underway between the two countries. For a nuclear power with a population of 250 million, such rhetoric represents a qualitative leap, especially given that the Qatari ceasefire of October 2025 has effectively been shattered.

The Cost of Closed Borders

The five main Afghan-Pakistani border crossings have been closed since October 2025 — more than four months. This is the longest border closure in decades. Trade between the two countries has completely halted, and with it a key transit route leading to Central Asia has been paralyzed.

The scale of consequences extends far beyond bilateral relations. According to NPR, containers with goods from China, Malaysia, and Vietnam destined for Afghanistan have gotten stuck at Karachi port. Afghan exports to Pakistan fell by $300 million year-on-year. Entrepreneurs in Peshawar are suffering losses of hundreds of thousands of dollars from spoiled inventory and have effectively stopped paying wages. The Taliban, for its part, imposed a ban on the import of Pakistani pharmaceuticals, even though Afghanistan depends on Pakistan for more than 60% of its medicines.

For Central Asian countries, this means that the transit agreements signed in early February currently have no physical corridor for implementation. Terminals at Karachi port, preferential port access, preferential trade regimes exist on paper, but a cargo from Tashkent or Astana cannot pass through territory where fighting is ongoing and border crossings are closed.

Two Corridors Under Fire

Uzbekistan views the railway project Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar, known as the ‘Kabul Corridor,’ as a priority of its transport strategy. For Tashkent, this project has not only economic but also geopolitical significance, as it would allow for the first time the formation of a direct southern outlet independent of northern or eastern transit routes.

Astana is promoting an alternative corridor through western Afghanistan. The route Turgundi–Herat–Kandahar–Spin Boldak is considered simpler from an engineering standpoint due to its flat terrain. Kazakhstan plans to invest approximately $500 million, including the construction of a logistics hub in Herat. In perspective, this route can reduce delivery times to South Asian markets by tenfold.

Notably, the current fighting is occurring precisely in the zones traversed by both corridors. The ‘Kabul Corridor’ leads to the Salang Pass and then through Nangarhar to the Torkham border crossing, which is currently closed and under fire. Pakistani air strikes on Kabul add risks to the central section of the route. The western Kazakhstani route passes through Kandahar, which also came under air strikes on February 27, and the endpoint — the Spin Boldak crossing — was the scene of major clashes as far back as October 2025. Thus, neither of the two planned Trans-Afghan corridors currently passes through safe territory.

The Indian Factor: A New Dimension of the Conflict

The Afghan-Pakistani confrontation cannot be understood outside the context of the rapid rapprochement between India and the Taliban, which creates additional strategic pressure on Islamabad. India immediately condemned Pakistan’s air strikes of February 22, supporting Afghanistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity — during Ramadan, this gesture carried special symbolic weight.

Over the past year, relations between New Delhi and Kabul have progressed from cautious humanitarian contacts to full-fledged diplomatic rapprochement. In October 2025, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi made an eight-day visit to New Delhi, the first at such a level since 2021. India announced the resumption of its embassy operations in Kabul. In February 2026, the Taliban sent a diplomat to India for the first time in five years. Pakistan, in turn, accused Afghanistan of becoming an ‘Indian colony.’

For Central Asia’s southern vector, this means that the Trans-Afghan route passes not simply through a zone of bilateral conflict, but through an arena of triple geopolitical rivalry among Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India. Afghanistan is turning into a space for the clash of foreign interests, where Central Asia’s transit ambitions become hostages to others’ conflicts. According to ACLED, 2025 was one of the most violent years in over a decade: more than 1,000 violent incidents involving the TTP were recorded across Pakistan, and trends for 2026 are at the same level or higher.

The Karakoram Bypass: A Temporary Solution with Limitations

While railway projects remain in the planning stage and Trans-Afghan routes are effectively blocked, Islamabad is offering the use of the Karakoram Highway through China as an interim trade channel. However, the institutional framework for this route has not been worked out: Pakistani entrepreneurs seeking alternative paths note that the rules for transit trade through China remain unclear. The alternative Iranian route is limited by international sanctions and instability in banking channels.

Conclusion

The visits of the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Pakistan reflect not an episodic diplomatic surge, but the formation of a new southern development vector for Central Asia. Despite different approaches to developing the Trans-Afghan corridor, the goals of Astana and Tashkent largely coincide: the search for a sustainable outlet to the Indian Ocean and a rethinking of the region’s place in the Eurasian trade system.

However, the events of late February 2026 exposed a fundamental contradiction in this strategy. Diplomatic agreements have been signed, but the physical corridor for their implementation has been severed by armed conflict. Both planned routes pass through active combat zones. The border has been closed for more than four months. The rhetoric of the participants has shifted from ‘fragile ceasefire’ to ‘open war.’ And the emerging India-Afghanistan axis creates additional incentives for Pakistan to take harsh action in the Afghan direction, which only worsens the instability of the transit space.

In this sense, the synchronicity of the visits to Islamabad becomes not a coincidence, but a sign of the beginning of a proactive struggle for a new economic geography of Central Asia. But the question now is not whether Astana and Tashkent want to reach the South, but whether a path exists along which they can actually travel.

Development Scenarios for the Southern Vector to 2030

Scenario A — ‘The Southern Corridor Becomes a Working Route’

Probability: low (given the current trajectory)

By 2030, a stable transit corridor forms between Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Trans-Afghan projects move from the stage of political declarations to operational infrastructure. Trade of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with Pakistan grows, and access to the ports of Karachi and Gwadar becomes a regular logistics practice.

Indicators:

• Sustainable normalization of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations through mediation by Qatar, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia
• Reduction in transit threats and the emergence of sustainable security mechanisms
• Launch of construction of ‘anchor’ sections of railway on at least one of the routes with clear timelines
• Establishment of permanent Central Asian logistics terminals at Pakistani ports

Consequences:

• Significant reduction in logistics costs for exports from Central Asia
• Expansion of the commodity basket, reduction of ‘commodity monoculture’
• Reduction of Central Asian countries’ dependence on routes through Russia and China

Scenario B — ‘Cautious Progress: The Southern Vector Grows but Remains Auxiliary’

Probability: baseline scenario, however the window between B and C is critically narrowing

Until 2030, the southern vector develops, but its pace is limited by strained relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Periodic crises and border closures do not lead to a complete halt of projects, but make the development of the corridor uneven. Central Asian states continue to invest while simultaneously diversifying risks.

Indicators:

• Periodic crises and local military incidents without transition to a full-scale and protracted conflict
• Construction of individual railway sections and terminals without achieving a ‘through’ corridor
• Growth in trade figures with Pakistan, but below stated targets ($1B / $2B)
• Persistence of high insurance premiums on the Afghan route
• Partial institutionalization of cooperation without a ‘breakthrough’

Consequences:

• The southern route functions episodically, supplementing the Middle and northern corridors
• Pakistan consolidates as a promising direction but remains secondary
• The southern strategy becomes a long-term project ‘ripening gradually’

Scenario C — ‘Unrealized Potential’

Probability: high in the short term; most indicators already realized as of February 2026

By 2030, the deterioration of Afghan-Pakistani relations becomes the main factor in the failure of the southern vector. Regular military strikes, border closures, and growing terrorist activity make Trans-Afghan projects economically unfeasible. The Indian factor further polarizes the conflict. Infrastructure remains incomplete and investments are frozen.

Indicators (status as of February 27, 2026):

• Regular air strikes on Afghan territory, including Kabul — ✔ realized
• Extended border crossing closures (>100 days) — ✔ realized
• Large-scale armed clashes along the border — ✔ realized
• Rhetoric of ‘open war’ from Pakistan’s leadership — ✔ realized
• Suspension of financing for railway projects — at risk
• Refusal of carriers to serve the Afghan route; rising logistics costs — ✔ realized

Consequences:

• The Trans-Afghan corridor remains unrealized
• Central Asian trade with Pakistan stagnates or declines
• Central Asia maintains high dependence on routes through Russia and China
• The southern vector turns into a strategic idea without an infrastructure base
• India-Afghanistan rapprochement strengthens Pakistan’s motivation for use of force, creating a vicious cycle of escalation